Murder District

Facts. Oscar Pistorius fired four shots through a closed toilet door in his home, killing Reeva Steenkamp, claiming he believed an intruder was behind the door. The trial court (Gauteng High Court) convicted him of culpable homicide; on the State's appeal the SCA replaced that with a murder conviction; the Constitutional Court later refused Pistorius leave to appeal, so the SCA's murder conviction stood.

Legal question. For dolus eventualis, must the accused have foreseen the death of the specific, correctly-identified victim, or does foresight that whoever was behind the door might die suffice?

Judgment. The SCA (per Leach JA) held the trial court had misapplied dolus eventualis: on the accused's own version he foresaw that the person behind the door could be killed and fired anyway. The culpable-homicide conviction was set aside and replaced with murder.

Significance. The highest-profile modern application of dolus eventualis. Confirms that a mistaken belief about the victim's identity does not exclude intention, and that it was the SCA — not the Constitutional Court — that entered the murder conviction (the CC merely refused leave to appeal).

Exam tip. Use Pistorius for two points: (1) dolus eventualis requires foresight of the possibility of death plus reconciliation; and (2) error as to the victim's identity (error in objecto) does not exclude dolus. Cite the SCA, not the CC, for the murder conviction.

Facts. A bus driver drove around a closed boom and across a railway level crossing, into the path of an oncoming train. The bus was struck and ten schoolchildren were killed. He was convicted of murder (dolus eventualis) and attempted murder in the trial court.

Legal question. Was dolus eventualis established — in particular, did the driver reconcile himself with the possibility of the passengers' deaths, or did he merely (negligently) believe the collision would not occur?

Judgment. The SCA (per Brand JA) set aside the murder and attempted-murder convictions and substituted culpable homicide. Although the driver foresaw the possibility of a collision, it was not proved that he reconciled himself with the deaths — he took a calculated (if grossly negligent) risk, banking on getting across in time.

Significance. The leading modern authority on the SECOND (volitional) leg of dolus eventualis — reconciliation. It is the key case distinguishing dolus eventualis from conscious negligence (luxuria): foresight of the risk without reconciliation yields culpable homicide, not murder.

Exam tip. Do NOT stop at foresight. Humphreys is the trap-case: he foresaw the risk but did not reconcile himself with the deaths, so he was guilty of culpable homicide, not murder. Contrast Pistorius (foresight + reconciliation → murder).

Facts. Goosen took part in an armed robbery, foreseeing the possibility that a fellow robber might intentionally shoot and kill the victim. In the event, however, the fellow robber's firearm discharged involuntarily and accidentally — not as a deliberate shot — and the deceased was killed.

Legal question. For dolus eventualis, must the accused have foreseen the actual way (the causal sequence) in which the death occurred, or is foresight of death in general enough, regardless of how it comes about?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held that, because Goosen foresaw an intentional shooting but the death resulted from an involuntary, accidental discharge — a material deviation from the foreseen causal sequence — the intention (dolus eventualis) required for murder was not established.

Significance. The leading authority establishing "foresight of the causal sequence" as a requirement of dolus eventualis in consequence crimes. Before Goosen the manner in which the consequence occurred was irrelevant so long as the consequence itself was foreseen; Goosen changed that.

Exam tip. Use Goosen for the foresight-of-the-causal-sequence rule: if death occurs in a way markedly different from what the accused foresaw, dolus eventualis fails. Distinguish foreseeing a deliberate shot from an accidental or involuntary discharge.

Facts. The accused shot the victim, who became a paraplegic. Months after discharge from hospital the victim died from pressure sores caused by neglecting to change position — something a paraplegic must do. The question was whether the accused had legally caused the death.

Legal question. Had the accused legally caused the victim's death, given that the immediate cause of death was the victim's own failure to change his position?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held that the accused's original act (the shooting) was not the proximate cause of the specific death. The victim's failure to take the precautions required by his paraplegic condition broke the legal causal chain.

Significance. The leading SA authority on legal causation. The flexible "proximate cause" test replaced a rigid approach and allows courts to consider whether it would be just and reasonable to hold the accused liable for the precise way in which the harm materialised.

Exam tip. Remember: factual causation (but-for test) is only the first step. Legal causation asks whether the accused's act was sufficiently closely connected to the death. Use Mokgethi for the flexible test; contrast with Tembani where medical treatment did NOT break the chain.

Facts. The accused stabbed the victim who was hospitalised. In hospital the victim developed a bacterial infection and died — partly from the original injury and partly from the hospital-acquired infection. The accused argued that the medical treatment (and resulting infection) broke the causal chain.

Legal question. Does a complication arising from medical treatment of a stab wound constitute a novus actus interveniens that breaks the causal chain between the accused's act and the victim's death?

Judgment. The SCA upheld the murder conviction. The medical complications were a foreseeable consequence of the original assault. The accused takes the victim as he finds them, including the risks of medical intervention needed because of the accused's own unlawful act.

Significance. The leading authority on the novus actus doctrine in the medical-treatment context. Confirms the principle that the accused cannot escape liability because the victim sought treatment, and that foreseeable treatment-related complications do not break the chain.

Exam tip. Pair with Mokgethi. Both deal with legal causation. In Tembani the chain held (treatment is foreseeable); in Mokgethi the chain was broken (victim's own choice not to take necessary precautions). Use to illustrate when the chain breaks and when it does not.

Facts. Two men were threatened by a third armed man who ordered them to kill a fourth person or be killed themselves. One of the two participated in the killing; the other did not. The participant was charged with murder and raised necessity as a defence.

Legal question. Can necessity operate as a complete defence to murder, and if so, under what conditions?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held that necessity could in principle be a complete defence to murder in truly exceptional circumstances. The convicted accused's appeal was allowed — he had been threatened with his own death and could not reasonably have been expected to resist.

Significance. The leading authority allowing necessity as a complete defence to murder in SA law — highly exceptional. Establishes that even the most serious crime can yield to necessity where the threat is irresistible and imminent. Contrasted with situations where the accused could have avoided the dilemma.

Exam tip. Necessity as a complete defence to murder: available in principle but applied very strictly. The reasonable person standard is critical — would a reasonable person also have yielded? Note the difference from private defence (which requires an unlawful attack by another person).

Facts. The accused, believing his life was in danger from two people approaching his vehicle at night, fired shots killing one and wounding another. It turned out the people were not actually armed and posed no real threat.

Legal question. Can a person who honestly but unreasonably believes he is under attack rely on private defence (putative private defence)?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held that putative private defence negates dolus where the accused genuinely (though mistakenly) believed he was acting in self-defence. Liability was reduced from murder to culpable homicide.

Significance. The leading case on putative private defence — the situation where the accused mistakenly believes the requirements for private defence are present. Confirms the distinction between genuine (private) defence and putative (mistaken) defence, and explains the fault consequences.

Exam tip. Distinguish: (1) Real private defence — the attack actually exists, conduct is justified and no crime. (2) Putative private defence (De Oliveira) — the accused genuinely but wrongly believes an attack exists; dolus negated, may reduce to culpable homicide. Know both and apply to facts.