The District of Conduct

Facts. The accused, who had been fasting and had drunk alcohol, entered a state of automatism (a dissociative state brought on by hypoglycaemia) and shot and killed a person in a bar. He acted without conscious control.

Legal question. Is a person who acts in a state of automatism (not caused by mental illness) criminally liable, given that criminal liability requires a voluntary act?

Judgment. The court found that the accused had acted involuntarily in a state of sane automatism and accordingly could not be held criminally liable for the killing.

Significance. A classic illustration of sane automatism negating the voluntary-conduct (act) requirement, and of the distinction between sane and insane automatism.

Exam tip. Use Stellmacher for the voluntariness requirement and sane automatism. Distinguish sane automatism (acquittal) from insane automatism (mental illness → s 78 CPA special verdict). Beware antecedent liability where the accused culpably caused their own automatic state.

Facts. Ewels, an ordinary citizen, was assaulted inside a police station by a sergeant who was off duty. Several on-duty policemen were present and could readily have prevented or stopped the attack, but stood by and did nothing. Ewels survived and sued the Minister in delict for damages, based on the on-duty policemen's failure to intervene. This is a civil claim, not a prosecution — nobody died and nobody was charged.

Legal question. When does a legal duty to act positively arise, so that a failure to act is wrongful? Is the list of recognised duty categories closed?

Judgment. The Appellate Division abandoned the closed-category approach. The duty on the policemen to come to Ewels's assistance was a legal duty; since the failure occurred in the course of their duties, the Minister was vicariously liable for the damages claimed.

Significance. The leading authority on wrongful omissions. Decided in delict, its boni mores criterion has been received into criminal law by analogy for assessing the unlawfulness of an omission, and it is cited in that context throughout SA criminal law. The general test is the same; what differs is that criminal liability additionally requires fault (intention or negligence) and a crime charged.

Exam tip. Essential for any omissions question. State the general rule: an omission is unlawful where the boni mores demand positive action. Then identify the source of the duty on the facts (statute, contract, prior conduct, special relationship, public office) — the list is not closed, but these categories guide the analysis. Name it correctly: it is Minister van Polisie v Ewels, a delict case — writing "S v Ewels" or claiming an accused was convicted will cost you marks.

Facts. Mr Skosana was injured in a car accident, arrested for drunken driving and detained. He later complained of severe abdominal pain; despite a doctor's note that he be taken to hospital immediately, there was a negligent delay in providing medical aid, and he died. His widow claimed damages, alleging that the delay caused his death.

Legal question. How is factual causation determined, and how does it differ from legal causation? Was the negligent delay in obtaining medical treatment a cause of the death?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held, on a balance of probabilities, that but for the negligent delay the deceased would not have died — factual causation was established — and the Minister was liable.

Significance. The foundational South African statement of the distinction between factual causation (the but-for test) and legal causation. Although a delict case, it is the standard authority cited for factual causation in criminal law too.

Exam tip. Use Skosana for the two-stage causation enquiry and the but-for test of factual causation. Establish factual causation first (Skosana), then turn to legal causation (Mokgethi, Daniëls).

Facts. The accused shot the deceased twice in the back; these wounds were mortal and the deceased would have died within about half an hour without medical treatment, in a remote area where none was available. A further shot was then fired into his head, killing him instantly — and it was not proved that the accused fired that final shot.

Legal question. Can the accused be the legal cause of the death where the immediate cause was a later shot, and is only a "proximate" cause recognised as a legal cause in South African law?

Judgment. The Appellate Division dealt with whether the back wounds (rather than the fatal head shot) legally caused the death; the judges rejected proximate cause as the sole criterion and analysed legal causation through the broader theories of causation.

Significance. A landmark causation decision and the clearest South African rejection of the proximate-cause theory as the exclusive test for legal causation. It paved the way for the flexible approach later confirmed in Mokgethi.

Exam tip. Use Daniëls to show that legal causation is not limited to the proximate cause, and to introduce the adequate-causation theory. Read it with Mokgethi (the flexible umbrella test).

Facts. The accused shot the victim, who became a paraplegic. Months after discharge from hospital the victim died from pressure sores caused by neglecting to change position — something a paraplegic must do. The question was whether the accused had legally caused the death.

Legal question. Had the accused legally caused the victim's death, given that the immediate cause of death was the victim's own failure to change his position?

Judgment. The Appellate Division held that the accused's original act (the shooting) was not the proximate cause of the specific death. The victim's failure to take the precautions required by his paraplegic condition broke the legal causal chain.

Significance. The leading SA authority on legal causation. The flexible "proximate cause" test replaced a rigid approach and allows courts to consider whether it would be just and reasonable to hold the accused liable for the precise way in which the harm materialised.

Exam tip. Remember: factual causation (but-for test) is only the first step. Legal causation asks whether the accused's act was sufficiently closely connected to the death. Use Mokgethi for the flexible test; contrast with Tembani where medical treatment did NOT break the chain.

Facts. During a robbery the accused shot the deceased in the neck. She was placed on a ventilator in hospital but, two days later, showed no brain activity; after further neurological examination the ventilator was disconnected and she registered no heart activity. The accused argued that the cause of death was the disconnection of the ventilator, not the gunshot — a novus actus interveniens.

Legal question. Does the disconnection of a ventilator from a brain-dead patient, kept alive artificially after being mortally wounded, constitute a novus actus interveniens that breaks the causal chain between the wounding and the death?

Judgment. The Appellate Division upheld the murder conviction. The original gunshot wound remained the operative legal cause of death; disconnecting the ventilator from a brain-dead patient did not break the chain of causation.

Significance. A leading authority on novus actus interveniens in the medical / life-support context. It confirms that withdrawing futile artificial life-support does not relieve the original wrongdoer of causal responsibility for the death.

Exam tip. Use Williams for the life-support scenario: switching off a ventilator on a brain-dead patient is not a novus actus. Pair with Tembani (treatment complications) — in both, the chain holds; contrast with Mokgethi, where the victim's own omission broke it.

Facts. The accused stabbed the victim who was hospitalised. In hospital the victim developed a bacterial infection and died — partly from the original injury and partly from the hospital-acquired infection. The accused argued that the medical treatment (and resulting infection) broke the causal chain.

Legal question. Does a complication arising from medical treatment of a stab wound constitute a novus actus interveniens that breaks the causal chain between the accused's act and the victim's death?

Judgment. The SCA upheld the murder conviction. The medical complications were a foreseeable consequence of the original assault. The accused takes the victim as he finds them, including the risks of medical intervention needed because of the accused's own unlawful act.

Significance. The leading authority on the novus actus doctrine in the medical-treatment context. Confirms the principle that the accused cannot escape liability because the victim sought treatment, and that foreseeable treatment-related complications do not break the chain.

Exam tip. Pair with Mokgethi. Both deal with legal causation. In Tembani the chain held (treatment is foreseeable); in Mokgethi the chain was broken (victim's own choice not to take necessary precautions). Use to illustrate when the chain breaks and when it does not.