Grounds
The Grounds for Divorce
A no-fault system with one main ground: irretrievable breakdown.
The statute
Divorce is governed by the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. A marriage may be dissolved only by a court, and only on one of the statutory grounds. South Africa has a no-fault divorce system — the court asks whether the marriage has broken down, not who is to blame.
The three grounds
- Irretrievable breakdown (s 4) — the main ground: the marriage has reached a state of disintegration with no reasonable prospect of restoring a normal relationship
- Mental illness of a spouse (s 5) — institutionalised/incurable for the prescribed period
- Continuous unconsciousness of a spouse (s 5) — for the prescribed period, with no reasonable prospect of recovery
Guidelines for breakdown
Section 4(2) gives (non-exhaustive) guidelines from which a court may infer irretrievable breakdown: the spouses have not lived together as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least one year; one spouse has committed adultery and the other finds continued cohabitation irreconcilable; or a spouse has been declared a habitual criminal and imprisoned.
Section 5A — religious dissolution
Section 5A of the Divorce Act (inserted in 1996) addresses the situation where a party prevents the religious dissolution of the marriage. A classic example is the Jewish get (the husband's religious bill of divorcement): without it, a Jewish wife may be unable to remarry under Jewish law (agunah — "chained woman"). Where a party has the power to give or obtain a religious dissolution and refuses to do so, the court may refuse to grant the civil divorce until such dissolution is provided or the obstacle is removed. This gives the court leverage to compel a recalcitrant spouse to co-operate with religious dissolution as a condition of obtaining the civil divorce.
Key Rule
No-fault divorce under the Divorce Act 70 of 1979: grounds are irretrievable breakdown (s 4), mental illness and continuous unconsciousness (s 5). Only a court can grant a divorce. S 5A: court may refuse civil divorce if a party withholds a religious dissolution (e.g., Jewish get).
Common Mistake
Treating the s 4(2) factors (one year apart, adultery, habitual criminal) as requirements. They are only guidelines/evidence of irretrievable breakdown — the real question is whether the marriage has irretrievably broken down.
Leading Cases
Schwartz v Schwartz1984 (4) SA 467 (A)On proving irretrievable breakdown: the court looks at the marriage as a whole to decide whether there is no reasonable prospect of restoring a normal marriage relationship.
Facts. A spouse sought a divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown; the state of the marriage was in issue.
Legal question. How does a court determine whether a marriage has irretrievably broken down?
Judgment. The Appellate Division applied this holistic test to the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
Significance. Leading authority on proving irretrievable breakdown under s 4 of the Divorce Act.
Exam tip. Stress that the s 4(2) examples merely evidence breakdown; the real question is the prospect of restoring a normal marriage.
Property
The Patrimonial Consequences
Divide the estate — subject to forfeiture, redistribution and pension interest.
Division by regime
On divorce the estate is dealt with according to the matrimonial property system: an in community marriage is divided equally; an accrual marriage triggers the accrual claim; a marriage out of community without accrual means each spouse simply keeps their own estate.
Forfeiture of benefits (s 9)
A court may order forfeiture of the patrimonial benefits of the marriage against a spouse if, having regard to the duration of the marriage, the circumstances giving rise to the breakdown, and any substantial misconduct, it finds that the spouse would be unduly benefited if no order were made (Wijker v Wijker). A spouse can only forfeit what they would otherwise gain from the other's estate — never their own contributions.
Redistribution (s 7(3)-(6))
Where spouses were married out of community of property without accrual, a court may order a redistribution of assets — transferring assets from one spouse to the other to reflect the applicant's direct or indirect contribution to the other's estate. It is an equitable, broad discretion (Beaumont v Beaumont; Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout). Important reform: s 7(3)(a) originally confined redistribution to marriages entered into before 1 November 1984 (the MPA commencement). In EB v ER; KG v Minister of Home Affairs [2023] ZACC 32 the Constitutional Court confirmed two declarations of invalidity, decided together but on different points: KG struck the date limit, and EB v ER extended redistribution to marriages dissolved by death rather than divorce. Both declarations were suspended for 24 months; meanwhile the words "before the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, 1984" are notionally severed from s 7(3)(a), and a new s 36A is read into the MPA for the death case. So redistribution now reaches out-of-community non-accrual marriages regardless of date — but by way of an interim court order pending remedial legislation, not yet by statute. Accrual marriages share via the accrual calculation, not redistribution.
Pension interest (s 7(7)-(8))
The pension interest of a spouse is deemed part of their assets for the division, and the court may order the fund to pay a portion to the other spouse — giving effect to the clean-break principle.
Key Rule
Divide per the regime. Forfeiture (s 9): no undue benefit — duration, misconduct, cause of breakdown. Redistribution (s 7(3)): since EB v ER; KG [2023] ZACC 32 it reaches ALL out-of-community non-accrual marriages (date-bar severed), and marriages ended by death (s 36A read into the MPA) — both as interim relief pending legislation. Pension interest counts and can be split (clean break).
Common Mistake
Stating that redistribution (s 7(3)) still only applies to marriages entered into before 1 November 1984. That date limit was declared invalid in KG ([2023] ZACC 32) and is severed pending legislation. Two further traps: the reform came from the Constitutional Court, not from the Divorce Amendment Act 1 of 2024 (that Act is about Muslim marriages and answers different litigation); and there is no "1988 cut-off" — the date is 1 November 1984, the MPA commencement.
Leading Cases
Wijker v Wijker1993 (4) SA 720 (A)Forfeiture under s 9: first decide whether a party will be benefited; then whether, given duration, misconduct and cause of breakdown, that benefit is undue.
Facts. On divorce, one spouse sought an order forfeiting the patrimonial benefits of the marriage against the other.
Legal question. How is forfeiture of patrimonial benefits determined under s 9 of the Divorce Act?
Judgment. The Appellate Division set aside the forfeiture order, clarifying the correct approach.
Significance. The leading authority on forfeiture of benefits under s 9 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
Exam tip. Remember: a party can only forfeit a benefit (a net gain from the other's estate), never their own contribution. Misconduct alone is not decisive.
Beaumont v Beaumont1987 (1) SA 967 (A)Leading authority on the redistribution discretion under s 7(3) — a broad, equitable enquiry recognising indirect contributions.
Facts. On divorce of a marriage out of community of property, a spouse sought a redistribution of assets to reflect her contribution to the other's estate.
Legal question. How does a court exercise the redistribution discretion under s 7(3) of the Divorce Act?
Judgment. The Appellate Division set out the broad, discretionary and equitable approach to redistribution.
Significance. The foundational authority on redistribution orders for older out-of-community marriages.
Exam tip. Note redistribution applies only to out-of-community marriages before the statutory cut-off; indirect (e.g. homemaking) contributions count.
Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout2005 (2) SA 187 (SCA)Refined the factors relevant to a s 7(3) redistribution order, including contributions and the parties' circumstances.
Facts. A redistribution claim required the court to weigh the parties' contributions and circumstances on divorce.
Legal question. What factors guide the size of a redistribution order under s 7(3)-(5)?
Judgment. The SCA refined the Beaumont approach and adjusted the redistribution on the facts.
Significance. Develops the redistribution enquiry and the weighing of contributions and circumstances.
Exam tip. Pair with Beaumont; emphasise the equitable, discretionary nature of the s 7(3) enquiry.
Spousal support
Spousal Maintenance
No automatic right — the court weighs need against ability.
No automatic right
There is no automatic right to post-divorce maintenance. Under s 7(2) of the Divorce Act a court may, in its discretion, order one spouse to maintain the other for a period or indefinitely, after weighing a list of factors.
The s 7(2) factors
- The parties' existing and prospective means
- Their respective earning capacities, financial needs and obligations
- The ages of the parties and the duration of the marriage
- The parties' standard of living during the marriage and their conduct so far as relevant to the breakdown
- Any redistribution order, and any other relevant factor
Kinds of order
Maintenance may be rehabilitative (for a limited period, to let a spouse retrain or re-enter the job market), permanent (typically after a long marriage where a spouse cannot become self-supporting), token (a nominal/small amount — only awarded where a present or probable future need actually exists, not as a general "insurance policy"), or none. Courts may also take into account the conduct of the parties under the s 7(2) factors insofar as conduct is relevant to the breakdown.
Settlement agreements (s 7(1))
Section 7(1) of the Divorce Act empowers a court to incorporate a settlement agreement into the divorce order, making it an order of court. Once incorporated, the agreement is enforceable as if it were a court order — breach is contempt of court. The court is not a rubber stamp: if the agreement is not in the best interests of the children or is otherwise contrary to public policy, the court may refuse to make it an order. Settlement agreements are the most common way spouses in practice regulate maintenance, children's residence, and property division.
Key Rule
Post-divorce maintenance is discretionary under s 7(2) — the court balances need and ability using the listed factors. Token maintenance requires an actual or probable future need. Settlement agreements made orders under s 7(1) are enforceable as contempt.
Common Mistake
Assuming a spouse is automatically entitled to lifelong maintenance. Modern courts favour self-sufficiency and often grant rehabilitative or no maintenance; permanent maintenance is reserved for cases of genuine need. Token maintenance is not awarded "just in case" — a need (present or probable) must be shown.
Children
The Children of Divorce
The child's best interests are paramount and the court is the upper guardian.
Best interests paramount
In any divorce affecting children, the best interests of the child are paramount (s 28(2) of the Constitution; s 9 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005). The court acts as upper guardian of all minor children.
The court's oversight (s 6)
Under s 6 of the Divorce Act a court will not grant a divorce until it is satisfied that the arrangements for the welfare of the children — care (custody), contact (access) and maintenance — are satisfactory or the best that can be achieved. The Family Advocate may investigate and report.
Care, contact & maintenance
The court allocates care and contact (and, where needed, guardianship) between the parents in the child's best interests, and fixes child maintenance — both parents remain liable to support their children according to their means, whatever the divorce outcome.
Key Rule
Children on divorce: best interests paramount (s 28(2) Constitution). Under s 6 Divorce Act the court must be satisfied the children's arrangements are adequate before granting the decree; the Family Advocate assists.
Common Mistake
Thinking parents can simply agree on the children between themselves. Their agreement is not enough — the court must independently be satisfied (s 6) that the arrangements serve the children's best interests.
Leading Cases
McCall v McCall1994 (3) SA 201 (C)Set out a widely-cited list of factors for determining a child's best interests in care/contact disputes.
Facts. Parents disputed the care of their son; the court had to decide what best served the child's interests.
Legal question. What factors determine the best interests of the child in a care/contact dispute?
Judgment. The court applied the best-interests standard, considering the enumerated factors and the child's own views.
Significance. A leading practical catalogue of best-interests factors, later reinforced by s 7 of the Children's Act.
Exam tip. Use as a checklist for best-interests arguments; align it with s 7 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005.